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A COMMENTARY:
THE PERFECT STORM: SCHRAMM DECISION, FMCSA, AND AN IMPOSIBLE DUTY
FOR BROKERS AND THIRD PARTY LOGISTICS COMPANIES
Paul Stewart
Attorney at Law
ABSTRACT
Over the last thirty years, there never has been a more confused doctrine than the current “duty of
reasonable care” faced by transportation brokers, third-party logistics companies and shippers as they
select carriers for transport. The confusion in what was once reasonable and well understood law has
been fueled by a perfect storm of judicial reasoning with misplaced reference to faulty empirical
data, the complete failure of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) to properly
assess carrier safety worthiness, a feeding frenzy by the plaintiffs’ bar and apathy by many in the
industry. The purpose of this commentary is to examine how this uncertainty developed, to identify
some of the more glaring issues that must be addressed, and to give some possible guidance as to
how the industry, FMCSA and courts should proceed to clarify the duty of a broker in complying
with “reasonable care” in selecting carriers.
INTRODUCTION
During thirty years as a transportation attorney,
general counsel to three third-party logistics
companies and former CEO of a logistics
company, there never has been a more confused
doctrine than the current “duty of reasonable
care” faced by transportation brokers, third-party
logistics companies and shippers as they select
carriers for transport. The confusion in what
was once reasonable and well understood law
has been fueled by a perfect storm of judicial
reasoning with misplaced reference to faulty
empirical data, the complete failure of the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA) to properly assess carrier safety
worthiness, a feeding frenzy by the plaintiffs’ bar
and apathy by many in the industry in the face of
some potentially serious challenges to the future
of competition in both the carrier and broker
sectors of the industry.

The purpose of this commentary is to examine
how this uncertainty developed, to identify some
of the more glaring issues that must be
addressed, and to give some possible guidance
as to how the industry, FMCSA and courts
should proceed to clarify the duty of a broker in
complying with the “reasonable care” standard
for selecting carriers.
Since the inception of the property broker
concept, brokers have for the most part been
held to a very limited duty of reasonable care
and diligent inquiry in the selection of carriers
for transport. As will be shown, the wisdom of
fifty years of state and federal courts construing
this duty to be limited is much more wellfounded than the more recent and patently
unsound extensions of this duty, requiring
brokers to be an ombudsman of safety
determinations in lieu of the FMCSA.1 *For all of
the twentieth century a broker’s duty with slight
exception was usually construed to mean that

1 SeeChubb Group of Insurance Companies v. H.A. Transportation Systems, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (C.D. Cal.
2002); CGU Int 7 Ins., PTC v. Keystone Lines Corp. , 2004 WL 1047982. *3 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2004); Schramm v.
Foster, 341 F. Supp. 2d 536 (D. Md. 2004); Jones v. C lI. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. 558 F. Supp. 2d 630.

Fall/ Winter 2011

7

brokers had to confirm that carriers they hired
satisfied the following requirements:

ANALYSIS
I.

1. Authorized by what is now the FMCSA;
2. Had regulatory mandated minimum
insurance coverage; and
3. Were competent insofar as any knowledge
the broker had or with reasonable care could
ascertain.2
Perhaps the Foster case' in 1969 was the first
real inroad into a broader duty by brokers. It
was clearly a precedent for some of the very
vague, ambiguous and judicial activist reasoning
and extremely poor direction by the Maryland
district court in the Schramm case. The Schramm
case, and its mandate that brokers/third party
logistics companies must look to a data base
(FMCSA’s Safety Status Measurement System,
“SafeStat”) that was full of error, and invalid as
a predictor of carrier safety worthiness, pivoted
off of Foster. It required that brokers look to a
source that could only create continued
confusion for brokers and shippers, since both
the SafeStat system and its successor, Safety
Management System (SMS), have been shown
to provide misleading and incomplete
information from which it is virtually impossible
to determine carrier safety worthiness, as will be
more thoroughly discussed herin.
If one is to properly address the current enigma
faced by brokers in their “new’' duty of
reasonable care in selecting carriers, decision
makers must understand how the fallacy of this
new duty was developed, with some hope that a
better understanding of this unfortunate rule of
law will be completely corrected.

The Foster case involved a shipper (Foster) who
had selected a carrier that was involved in an
automobile accident in which persons were
seriously injured, after the brakes on the carrier’s
truck failed. Plaintiffs, in addition to statutory
and regulatory infractions that are not pertinent,
alleged that the broker was negligent for
selecting “...an incompetent and careless
contractor (carrier)”. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reasoned first that the evidence was
insufficient to hold that Foster could have
known of prior acts of negligence by the carrier
of such number or magnitude to have found the
carrier to be incompetent or careless. They also
found that Foster had no actual knowledge of
cither poor reputation or lack of authority on the
part of the carrier.*4 5
Had the Court stopped there, as they should
have, the ambiguous reasoning and inexplicable
duties for brokers pronounced in the Schramm
(2004) case perhaps would never have been
visited upon the truck brokerage industry. The
Foster (1969) court could have followed the
conclusion reached in Mooney v. Stainless, Inc, a
1964 case out of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals.1
... we believe the better rule to be that in
order to render an employer liable under
the theory of negligent selection of an
independent contractor in cases such as
the one at bar, it is necessary to establish
that, at the time of hiring, the employer
had either actual or constructive
knowledge that the independent
contractor was incompetent.6

2 L.B. Foster Company v. Hurnhlad, 418 F. 2d 727, 730 (9th C’ir. 1969)
3Id.
4 Foster, at 730, 731.
5 338 F. 2d 127 (6lh Cir. 1964)
6 Id. at 131
8

Journal of Transportation Management

The Foster Case and 1 low it Was Bad Law
and a Faulty Foundation for Schramm

In addition, the mere fact that an independent
contractor might subsequently engage in a
negligent act raises no presumption that the
employer was negligent in selecting the
independent contractor for the job.7
Instead, as in so many cases where it seems that
legal reasoning is replaced with the purpose of
sustaining a sympathy verdict, the Foster court
found that where direct evidence of negligence is
missing, a jury can infer negligence by a
. .carrier’s or transportation broker’s lack of
experience, poor financial condition, failure to
respect certificate requirements, and willingness
to do business at cut rates.”8 From this premise,
notwithstanding a total lack of affirmative proof
of incompetence, or prior negligence, the Court
went on to find that Foster “...failed to make a
reasonable inquiry as to [the carrier’s]
competence.”9
If we are to understand the fallacy of the new
duty of due care placed upon brokers by the
Schramm court (and courts that have followed),
we must first realize that Foster was the only
case cited by Schramm as a premise for the
“new” duty of reasonable care and standard for
“reasonable inquiry”. Also, since the Foster
case was apparently the first court decision to
supplant direct evidence of prior knowledge of
carrier negligence with inference of negligence
based upon the business acumen and financial
sufficiency of the carrier, we must test that logic
against our own fair analysis, before moving on
to the failure of the Schramm court’s reasoning
in establishing an impossible standard of care.
Return to Foster, and recall that the Foster court
found no direct evidence of negligence by the
shipper in selecting the carrier, but ruled instead

that negligence could be inferred by the shipper
failing to make reasonable inquiry into the
. .carrier’s or transportation broker’s lack of
experience, poor financial condition, failure to
respect certificate requirements, and willingness
to do business at cut rates.”10 Assume arguendo
that a broker finds a carrier for which he knows
of no prior negligence or incompetence. The
broker then finds that the carrier has the
following characteristics:
1. The carrier is new and may have the
best drivers and equipment in the
business, but because the carrier is
new, there exists a “lack of
experience”.
2. Has some weak financials, as all start
ups and many solid performance
carriers do, thus is currently in “poor
financial condition”.
3. I las certificates of authority that may
be conditional because they are new,
or may have lapsed because of
administrative inefficiency.
4. Is willing to cut rates in order to gain
business, as will many very safe
carriers who have a “willingness to do
business at cut rates”.
Assume further that the broker contracts with
this carrier to deliver a load, knowing of no prior
acts of negligence and finding that the carrier is
not rated as “Unsatisfactory” by the FMCSA.
After the carrier accepts the load, there is a
horrible accident caused by the driver falling
asleep. For the broker in our hypothetical, and
the entire broker industry, how can any of the
standards put forward by the Foster case help, or
fairly be considered, in looking for the
proximate cause of this accident, or finding that

Mooney, at 131. citing Matanuska Electric Association, Inc. v. Johnson, 386 P. 2d 698 (Alaska); Strickland u State. 13
\lisc.2d 925. 1 ~!1 N.Y.S.2d 983: Ever v. Ilehnar, 272 Mich. 513. 262 N.W. 298: Silveus r. Grossman. 307 Pa. 212. 161
A. 362: 27 Am.Jur (Independent Contractors) 509
8 Foster, supra at 730
9 Id. at 731.
1°Id.
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the selection of the carrier by the broker was
negligent. The answer is that such standards are
of highly subjective quality and couldn’t
possibly be helpful in the absence of direct proof
of broker negligence. However, when courts
allow juries to infer negligence from such weak
logic, juries will too often create a path to a
sympathetic verdict. Such standards are
contradictions of sound judicial reasoning,
which have in the past required direct evidence
that the broker had actual or constructive
knowledge that the carrier was incompetent,
before attributing to the broker culpability for
negligent hiring.
The Foster court cited no authority for their
highly subjective standard for reasonable
inquiry. As in most bad law, they reasoned
backward to reach their result, by giving us a
checklist of business acumen, rather than a solid
inquiry standard. The suggested list of criteria
for an inference of negligence is immediately
exposed as fallacious when made a part of the
following:
• All carriers having poor financials and
willing to do business at cut rates are
negligent
• Carrier “A” has never had an accident
until now, has poor financials, lack of
experience and is willing to do business
at cut rates.
m Therefore, Carrier “A” must be
negligent.
One does not have to be an expert in argument
form to see how this syllogism stands out as
invalid. Further, other courts have considered
this very argument and correctly found that
business acumen and financial responsibility
have no place in such analysis.

As to the first point, we reject the notion
that financial irresponsibility is cither
equivalent to or a category of
incompetence. Cassano v. Aschoff.’ 226
N.J.Super. 110, 116.543 A.2d 973.
certif. denied, 113 N.J. 371, 550 A.2d
476 (1988): see also Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 411 comment g
(1965) (“The rule stated in this Section
makes the employer responsible only for
his failure to exercise reasonable care to
employ a contractor who is competent
and careful. It has no application where
the contractor, although competent... is
financially irresponsible.”).11
Equating lack of insurance and financial
responsibility with incompetence might
also wreak havoc in particular
industries, such as transportation,
because persons or entities contracting
for transportation services would be
required to make continuing inquiry into
the financial qualifications of the
contractor.12 [emphasis added]
Foster was bad law. Howcver, it was clearly the
faulty foundation for worse law by the Schramm
court, thirty-four years later. Both Foster and
Schramm are seemingly examples of how bad
law is often created by courts looking for social
justice where a tragic accident has occurred, or
reaching too far in creating a duty that has not
heretofore existed. They both remind us of
Justice Holmes’ often mis-paraphrased
comment, “Great cases like hard cases make bad
law. For great cases are called great, not by
reason of their real importance in shaping the
law of the future, but because of some accident
of immediate overwhelming interest which
appeals to the feelings and distorts the
j udgment.”13

11 Mavrikidis v. Petullo, 153 N.J. 117. 707 A.2d 977 (N.J.. 1998).
12 Id. at 139, citing Robinson v. Jiffy Executive Limousine Co, 4 F 3d 237 at 242.
13 Northern Securities Co. v. United States 193 U.S. 197,400-401.
10
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II. The Schramm Court Rules that Brokers
Must Reference an Invalid Database
(SafeStat).
The Schramm case, involved an accident in the
state of Maryland, caused when the carrier failed
to stop at an intersection and plaintiffs’
automobile collided with the carrier’s vehicle.
Injuries to the plaintiffs were catastrophic and
permanent. The Maryland District Court
considered a motion for summary judgment and
granted all parts of the motion, except for that
part relating to negligent hiring of the carrier by
the broker. With the seed of illogical “reasonable
inquiry” planted by Foster, what followed was
the sine qua non for the Schramm court to give
us the new and intractable duty for transportation
brokers:
This duty to use reasonable care in the
selection of carriers includes, at least,
the subsidiary duties (1) to check the
safety statistics and evaluations of the
carriers with whom it contracts
available on the SafeStat database
maintained by FMSCA, [italics mine]
and (2) to maintain internal records of
the persons with whom it contracts to
assure that they are not manipulating
their business practices in order to avoid
unsatisfactory SafeStat ratings.14
Perhaps the Schramm court was looking at least
in part for a more objective standard of
reasonable inquiry than what they saw in the
Foster decision. Perhaps they saw the same
inadequacy in such a business acumen test as
demonstrated here. However, they unknowingly
resorted to requirements that could not produce a
more reliable result when followed. In fairness
to the Schramm court, they apparently did not
know that their effort at a more objective
standard of reasonable care was doomed by the

completely inadequate authority they chose for
inquiry into carrier safety, i.e., ”... the SafeStat
database maintained by FMSCA.”
In fact, these “subsidiary duties” were on the day
announced counterproductive to any notion of
improving the process of selecting safe carriers.
Furthermore, the sanction of such a useless
process by a federal district court both greatly
confused the former duty of reasonable care for
transportation brokers, and at the same time
allowed FMCSA to further avoid its duty to be
the one and only entity to administer, evaluate
and determine carrier safety worthiness.
Consider the first “subsidiary duty” announced
by the district court:
“(1) to check the safety statistics and
evaluations of the carriers with whom it
contracts available on the SafeStat
database maintained by FMSCA.” 15
To scrutinize fairly the rationale by which the
Schramm court pronounced this duty, one must
ask: What would the broker in the Schramm
case have found had they looked carefully at
SafeStat, prior to selecting the carrier involved
in the ensuing accident? The accident and
concomitant duties of the broker which were the
subject of the court’s analysis occurred on May
2, 2002, and the court’s decision was announced
August 24, 2004. For the interim period between
the date of the accident and the court’s analysis
requiring brokers to look to the SafeStat system,
the U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of
Inspector General reported the following on
February 13, 2004:
1. Of 645,551 active interstate carriers
on record, only 26 percent had
sufficient data represented to
compute a value for one or more of
the four safety evaluation areas.

14 Schramm at 551. citing Foster, supra.
15 Schramm, supra
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2. One-third of crash reports, including
37,000 crashes involving interstate
carriers, were missing from the
FMCSA’s database.
3. As of January, 2003, 42 percent of
the reporting on active carriers
contained outdated data.
4. For the fiscal year 2002, the average
time in which to upload crash data
on carriers took 158 days.
5. Thirteen percent of the 21,000
crashes and over 70,000 of the
inspection transactions occurring in
our 6-month sample period contained
carrier identification errors, such as
failure to identify a carrier associated
with the violation, or in a smaller
number of instances, identifying the
wrong carrier.
6. In an estimated 11 percent of the
inspection errors the wrong carrier
was held accountable for the SafeStat
related violation.
7. Problems with the inaccurate data are
compounded because no effective
system is in place now to facilitate
the correction of errors in data
reporting.
8. Missing crash reports may place a
lower risk carrier in a deficient
category because data for a higher
risk carrier is not included in the
calculation.
9. The effectiveness of the SafeStat
scoring and ranking calculations is
highly dependent on the quality of
the crash data file, which in the past
was missing a substantial number of
reportable crashes.
10. If public dissemination of SafeStat
results is to continue, the data must
meet a higher standard. The types
and magnitude of data problems we

found argue for immediate and
effective action.16
Perhaps the Schramm court was somehow ruling
on insufficient or poorly presented evidence, or
took unfounded rationale without precedent
from briefs by the parties, but for unknown
reasons and no proven prior validity, the court
created a “subsidiary duty” sui generis, that was,
by objective facts then available, contrary to any
notion of best practice. Moreover, this newly
announced duty made it mandatory for brokers
to look to a source (SafeStat) that had been
found to be unreliable by the Inspector General’s
office six months before the Schramm decision
was published. In fact, the Inspector General’s
report was clearly saying that the data was
incomplete, invalid as an indicator of accurate
reporting on carriers and recommending that the
SafeStat site be taken out of public view and use
months before the Schramm court mandated its
use.
Seemingly, the Schramm court was desperate for
an empirical source to which brokers and other
shippers could turn and get a clear indication of
the safety worthiness of carriers. They
apparently assumed far greater validity for the
information to be found on SafeStat than existed.
With all of the information that was available at
the time of their decision, they either knew or
should have known that SafeStat was anything
but a failsafe source of carrier safety evaluation.
Still, inexplicably, they created a standard that
was immediately incapable of confirming
“reasonable care” or “diligent inquiry”, since the
source to which the court directed brokers could
not possibly provide completely valid
information, and thus, absolutely could not be
reliable, by definition.
(The reader is invited to test this conclusion
against any of the ten findings mentioned above

16 U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General: Executive Summary Audit Report No. MH2004-034. February 13. 2004; http://\v\v\v.oin.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/mh2004034.pdf
12
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in the Inspector General’s audit of 2004; e. g., if
11 percent of the inspection errors were
attributed to the wrong carrier, how may we
reliably make any determination as to the carrier
we are researching? If 74% of the registered
carriers did not have sufficient data represented,
how was the broker in Schramm to know with
reliability whether the carrier they were
researching was among them? If in 11 percent
of the inspection errors the wrong carrier was
held accountable for the SafeStat violation, how
was the broker to know whether the carrier they
were researching was among these wrongfully
charged with a violation.)
All indications of the unreliable nature of
SafeStat continued to mount from the time of the
Schramm decision. By 2007, the Inspector
General made the following findings and
recommendations:
•

•

•

•

We found that, although improvements
have been made, problems still exist
with the reporting of crash data.
Completeness of data is critical for
SafeStat because scoring involves a
relative safety ranking of one carrier
against other carriers competing for the
same business.
Missing crash reports may place a lower
risk carrier in a deficient category
because data for a higher risk carrier is
not included in the calculation.
Consequently, FMCSA should continue
to limit public use until it can assess
whether significant crash reporting
problems remain.
Before FMCSA allows public access to
SafeStat scores, it must improve its
ability to measure the completeness of
non-fatal crash reporting.17

Shortly after the Inspector General reported this
information to Congress; on February 21, 2008,
the FMCSA put the following disclaimer (in
part) on the SafeStat website:
“Caution Urged in the Use of SafeStat Data”
The message that followed this notice included a
description of how information was reported to
the FMCSA and problems with variation in that
data reporting. The description was summarized
with this statement:
“Accordingly, SafeStat’s ability to
accurately and objectively assess the
safety fitness of individual motor carriers
may be inconsistent and not conclusive
without additional analysis. " [emphasis
added]
This announcement confirming the invalidity of
the SafeStat information on carriers was then
followed by this boldfaced disclaimer:
WARNING
Because of State data variations,
FMCSA cautions those who seek to use
SafeStat data analysis system in ways
not intended by FMCSA. Please be
aware that use of SafeStat for purposes
other than identifying and prioritizing
carriers for FMCSA and state safety
improvement and enforcement programs
may produce unintended results and not
be suitable for certain uses.18
In the same year that the Schramm decision was
published, the Inspector General’s Office
concluded that SafeStat was no longer a valid
measurement device for carrier safety
worthiness: “FMCSA must act to revalidate the
SafeStat model because changes have occurred

U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General: Letter from Inspector Genera! Scoval to
Congressman Petri with attached Briefing, June 19, 2007; http://wMW.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/
SAFESTAT.PDF

18 FMCSA, Safety Measurement System, http://ai. fmesa.dot, gov/SMS/
Fall/Wintcr 2011
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since the 1998 study that supported the model’s
validity.”19 20
The Schramm court established a rule of law that
was clearly wrong on the date it was announced.
No clear and reliable safety determination was
available to the broker in Schramm had they “...
check[ed] the safety statistics and evaluations of
the carriers with whom it contracts available on
the SafeStat database maintained by FMSCA”,
nor was one available to all the brokers
henceforth that have been irresponsibly
burdened by this decision, which is inexplicable
except for the motive of reaching a social justice
decision. The FMCSA reporting function that
had been a failure since its inception in 1999,
was a failure prior to and on the date of the
Schramm decision, and continues to be a failure
to this day, even its present form known as
Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010 (CSA
2010), Safety Management System (SMS), as
later developed here.
In summary, the SafeStat measurement system of
carrier safety was invalid and unreliable at the
time of the ruling in Schramm. Flowever, due to
a lack of a careful and cogent analysis, courts
and court decisions have continued to allow
juries to consider the incredulous notion that
brokers should have looked to the SafeStat
system for information on carriers as a part of
their duty of reasonable care in selecting a
carrier.-10 Perhaps more important, the unusual
mandate by a federal court, giving specific
direction to such an unreliable source, has been
accepted as procedure that must be followed by
many who counsel transportation brokers on risk
management, and cottage industries have been
created to look for and evaluate information that
is by any definition unreliable.

III. FMCSA Replaces Safcr/SafeStat with
Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010
(CSA 2010) and the Safety Management
System (SMS).
The problems with SafeStat and continued
public outcry, along with Congressional
oversight and pressure, resulted in the FMCSA
announcing the agency function that was to
replace SafeStat as a carrier safety measurement
system. In their Five-Year Plan for 2006-2011,
the agency provided the first description of
CSA-2010:
The intent of CSA 2010 is to establish an
operational model that will determine
the relative safety fitness risk attributable
to every motor carrier and develop
streamlined approaches to change the
behavior of poor motor carrier
operations and their drivers. The CSA
2010 will ultimately provide FMCSA a
new modern-operational model that will
greatly enhance the Agency’s efficiency
at gathering and properly evaluating a
greater proportion of the regulated
population.21
This intent was followed by the rollout of the
CSA 2010 Operational Model, in December,
2010, with the following stated purpose: “CSA
re-engineers the former enforcement and
compliance process to provide a better view into
how well large commercial motor vehicle
carriers and drivers are complying with safety
rules, and to intervene earlier with those who are
not.”22
Since the inception of CSA 2010 and the SMS
measurement categories for carrier safety, this

19 Executive Summary Audit Report, supra, p. iv. (2004).
20 See, Jones v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. 558 F. Supp. 2d 630.
21 Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, FMCSA Strategic Plan 2006-2011. http://www.tmcsa.dot.tzov/fmesastrategic-plan-102907.htm
22 Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, CSA - Compliance, Safety, Accountability, website http://
csa. fmesa. dot, cov/about/csa how, aspx
14
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new alternative has also been found to be invalid
and unreliable for sueh a purpose. The
foundation for the conclusion that this
measurement system is also invalid and
unreliable for the purpose of determining carrier
safety with reasonable certainty includes the
following:
1. Anne Ferro, Administrator, FMCSA,
stated before Congress that the
FMCSA will replace SafeStat with
the Safety Management System
(SMS), and that the Agency can rate
only between two and three percent
of the carrier population annually.23
2. Because of skewed data and
disproportionate impact on carriers,
the National Association of Small
Trucking Companies (NASTC), ct al.
filed suit against the FMCSA on
November 29, 2010, seeking a stay
on the implementation of SMS and
its ostensible measurements of
carrier safety (Behavior Analysis and
Safety Improvement Categories
“BASICS’').24
3. In a settlement agreement between
NASTC, et.al., and FMCSA, on
March 4, 2011, the FMCSA, agreed
to publish a disclaimer on the SMS
website, admitting that,
Readers should not draw
conclusions about a carrier’s
ov erall safety condition simply
based on the data displayed in the
system [emphasis added] Unless a
motor carrier in the SMS has received

an UNSATISFACTORY, safety rating
pursuant to 49 CFR Part 385, or has
otherwise been ordered to discontinue
operations by FMCSA, it is
authorized to operate on the nation’s
roadways.25
4.During the twelve months that SMS
has been used by FMCSA to evaluate
carrier safety, there have been
numerous database changes, with the
following noted as deficiencies in
fairly rating all carriers within the
test states:
• Only 11 percent of regulated carriers
have any scores.
• Crash data includes both preventable
and non-preventable accidents. Less
than 4 percent of regulated carriers
have crash data included.
• “Unsafe driving” scores are recorded
only in conjunction with roadside
inspections, and measure only 4.8
percent of the regulated carriers.
• The “fatigued driving” BASIC
measures only 2.5 percent of the
regulated carriers.
• “Vehicle maintenance” measures
only 9 percent of the industry.
• “Driver fitness” measures only 2
pcrcentof the industry. Most points
are accumulated for drivers not
having medical cards in their
possession - not for actual
disqualifying medical conditions.26
Sueh uncertainty and lack of validity to critical
mass measurement of all regulated carriers has
led to concern by financial institutions and the
capital markets invested in the transportation

; Committee On Transportation And Infrastructure Subcommittee On I lighways And Transit U.S. House Of
Representatives; Statement ofAnne S. Ferro, Administrator, FMCSA;, June 23, 2010; http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/about/
ne\vs/speeches/Statement-of-Anne-S-Ferro0623 I O.aspx
24 National Association of Small Trucking Companies, et al. v. FMCSA (D.C. C'ir. No. 10-1402)
25 Id., Settlement Agreement, March 4, 2011. Document ID: 1297064
26 U.S. Department of Transportation. Paul E Green and Daniel Blower. Evaluation of the CSA 2010 Operational Model
Test, University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute, FMCSA-RRA-11-019 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2011),
p. 27.
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industry. One such company, Wells Fargo
Securities, LLC, completed a thorough statistical
analysis and reported their findings on
November 4, 2011,
In fact, according to our analysis of the
200 largest carriers in the CSA
database, we find no meaningful
statistical relationship between actual
accident frequency and BASIC scores
for Unsafe Driving, Fatigued Driving or
Driver Fitness... we feel BASIC scores
should not be used exclusively in
assessing carrier risk and that they may,
in fact, provide misleading
information.27
Unfortunately, since the installation of CSA
2010 and its measurement devices for carrier
safety contained within the SMS; brokers,
shippers and carriers are left with another
unreliable measurement system for carrier safety.
While CSA 2010 and its measurement system,
SMS, are the successors to SafeStat, no court has
yet been required to rule on whether brokers
have the duty to look to the carrier safety
information within SMS. However, brokers
operate daily under the threat of vicarious
liability should they fail to follow the mandate of
the Schramm Court, and A. .check the safety
statistics and evaluations of the carriers with
whom it contracts available on the SafeStat
database maintained by FMSCA.”28 29
Never has a court offered any more meaningless
and completely counterproductive direction.
The paranoia and complete uncertainty
surrounding the “new” duty of reasonable care
for brokers in selecting carriers should never
have come to be. It was originated by bad
analysis, and over-reaching judicial direction to

an invalid source of inquiry. The complete
impossibility of this new duty of care has been
exacerbated, rather than alleviated, by the
bandwagon tendency for some who advise
brokers to parrot the Schramm decision, and
advise that brokers must “... check the safety
statistics and evaluations of the carriers with
whom it contracts available on the SafeStat
database maintained by FMSCA”. Rhetorically,
and in fact, we must ask: To find what, exactly,
which might be reliable?
It was bad advice when originated by the
Schramm Court, for all the reasons outlined
herein, and it is bad advice today. In light of all
the information that has been generated and even
the admissions of the FMCSA, for brokers to
originate and perpetuate a business process that
requires them “...to check the safety statistics
and evaluations of the carriers with whom [they]
contract...” on either the former SafeStat
system, or its successor, the SMS, amounts to
drinking the proverbial Kool-Aid. A better
argument could perhaps be made that it is
negligence per se for brokers to make a
judgment about the safety worthiness of carriers
from what has been demonstrated to be
unreliable and certainly incomplete information
currently found on the SMS. They will never be
able to substantiate diligent inquiry by referring
to bits and pieces of unreliable data.
How can such an inquiry satisfy any meaningful
duty of due care, when the FMCSA directly
contradicts such advice on the SMS website with
their very clear disclaimer, “Readers should not
draw' conclusions about a carrier's overall
safety’ condition simply based on the data
displayed in the system."2'’ Further, as if the
disclaimer is not enough, FMCSA adds in its
explanation of what SMS is, and is not, “[t]he
SMS results displayed on the SMS website are

27 CSA: Good Intentions, Unclear Outcomes; Anthony Gallo, CFA, Senior Analyst; Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, Equity
Research Department, November 4, 2011
2S Schramm , supra
29 FMCSA. Safety Management System, http:/'ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/SMS/Data/
carrier.aspx?enc^KxcVSWt’Ecav9s9SnBUikeRZBvr+pUdovFGgZJQl 8\vi>s~
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not intended to imply any federal safety rating of
the carrier pursuant to 49 USC 31144.,m
[emphasis added] That being so, we must ask
was there ever any valid reason for brokers being
sent into this nightmare of "checking safety
statistics and evaluations of carriers”? The
answer is clearly, no! It resulted from bad law
and lack of understanding of just how
completely invalid the information was at the
bottom of the rabbit hole chosen by the
Schramm Court.
IV. How Must This Folly Be Corrected?
By different means and methods, a strong
consensus must be achieved by both courts and
Congress that the FMCSA is the only entity
charged with determining the relative safety of
commercial carriers. The nonsense must end.
Laypersons must not be charged with looking at
experimental and, so far, invalid tools in a futile
effort to somehow document “diligent inquiry”
from information that by definition is unreliable
as an indicator of current and complete
information on all carriers (and therefore, on the
carrier they are researching).
Congressional oversight of the FMCSA has been
lacking in requiring of FMCSA proper
accountability for their primary responsibility, at
least since the introduction of the SafeStat
system in 1999. No further Inspector General
audits and warnings should be required before
the FMCSA is either to admit that their
responsibility cannot be achieved by current
means, or completely sanction the rating of all
carriers for which they have not made a
determination of “UNSATISFACTORY”,
consistent with their own construction of their
duty,

Unless a motor carrier in the SMS has
received an UNSATISFACTORY, safety
rating pursuant to 49 CFR Part 385, or
has otherwise been ordered to
discontinue operations by FMCSA, it is
authorized to operate on the nation’s
roadways.30
31
There is in this advisory an immediate dilemma
for FMCSA if they, or the courts, suggest that
brokers should not be limited in their duty of
diligent inquiry to relying exclusively upon a
search for an “Unsatisfactory” rating, or not. To
suggest that a broker, with limited resources,
must look into the maze of unreliable
information, or infer relative safety from
BASICs that may be distorted for all the reasons
discussed herein, is to say that the broker (and
the public) cannot rely upon FMCSA to
authorize only safe carriers. Courts should in the
future be reluctant to hold a broker, with limited
understanding and reasons to believe that SMS
data may be unreliable, culpable for selecting a
carrier that has been authorized by FMCSA,
with their vast investment in measurement
systems with which to designate carriers as
“authorized”.
Title 49, U.S.Code § 31 144, requires the
Secretary of Transportation (delegated to
FMCSA per 49 CFR 385) to:
(1)

determine whether an owner or
operator is fit to operate safely
commercial motor vehicles, utilizing
among other things the accident record
of an owner or operator operating in
interstate commerce and the accident
record and safety inspection record of
such owner or operator -

(2) periodically update such safety
fitness determinations;

30 SMS Information Center, What is the Motor Carrier Safety Management System (SMS)?, http://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/
SMS/InfoCenter/default.aspx#question 1.
31 SMS Website, supra
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(3) make such final safety fitness
determinations readily available to
the public;

These helpful distinctions are made at 49 C.F.R.
§ 385.3 Definitions and acronyms:

• Safety fitness determination means the
There is no reasonable construction of this
final determination by FMCSA that a
statutory language that would impose upon
motor carrier meets the safety fitness
shippers, brokers and third-party logistics
standard under §385.5
companies the duty of determining whether a
• Safety' rating or rating means a rating of
carrier is safe. That is a statutory duty of the
“Satisfactory”, “Conditional” or
Department of Transportation, through the
“Unsatisfactory ”, which the FMCSA
offices of their administrative agency, the
assigns to a motor carrier using the
FMCSA. There is no statutory or regulatory
factors prescribed in § 385.7
authority for the FMCSA to delegate this
responsibility to members of the public who
FMCSA database measurement tools such as the
must choose a motor carrier from those
former SafeStat, or the current SMS, are not
registered with the FMCSA. There is no
safety' fitness determinations or safety ratings.
statutory or regulatory authority that allows a
They are measurement tools that remain under
SafeStat or SMS measurement category (i.e.,
development toward validity and reliability.
“BASICs”) to be used as a “safety rating” in lieu
They should be viewed as such in the future by
of the procedure prescribed by 49 CFR 385,
courts considering the admissibility of such
which by regulation mandates the statutory duty
uncertain data. While they are under
of the FMCSA to “make such final safety fitness
development, and until completely valid, they
determinations readily available to the public;”32 33 should not be viewed by the public in lieu of or
49 C.F.R. § 385.1 Purpose and Scope, provides:
(a) This part establishes FMCSA’s
procedures to determine the safety fitness
of motor carriers, to assign safety> ratings,
to direct motor carriers to take remedial
action when required, and to prohibit
motor carriers determined to be unfit
from operating a CMV. [emphasis added]
If we are to understand the confusion that has
been created by the FMCSA and exacerbated by
some courts, we must understand the difference
between this clear statutory duty and what has
resulted by years of FMCSA focus on safety
management controls, as a means of achieving
the ultimate objective and statutory duty to
provide ‘ final safety' fitness determinations ”n,
i.e., assign safety ratings.

32 49 U.S. Code § 31144 (3)
33 Id.
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in search of a statutorily required safety rating.
[emphasis added]
The former SafeStat and current SMS
measurement categories have been proven to be
nothing more than incomplete attempts to gather
metrics with which the FMCSA can make fitness
determinations and safety ratings. THEY ARE
NOT COMPLETED SAFETY RATINGS! It
follows that when such tools are of questionable
validity and reliability, they should be kept from
the public view, rather than be mistakenly
designated by courts as sources to which brokers
must look. To do so would avoid the many dire
consequences brought about by misleading the
shipping public, and the courts that have
misguidedly given these invalid tools
undeserved credence as part of common law
duties.

A. Suggested Congressional Action
The FMCSA has completely failed to fulfill the
statutory and regulatory duty of providing to the
public accurate and timely safety ratings on all
registered carriers. This failure is glaring and
complete, since the inception of the FMCSA in
1999. There has never been a time, since the
inception of the FMCSA, that they have been
able to publish a “final safety fitness
determination” for all, or even a significant
portion of the active interstate motor carriers.
As of December 23, 2011, the FMCSA reports:
• 792,704 active interstate motor
carriers, with 118,327 (14.92%) of
these having a safety rating of cither
Satisfactory, Conditional, or
Unsatisfactory.
• 338,380 For Hire interstate motor
carriers, with 61,067 (18%) of these
having a safety rating of either
Satisfactory, Conditional, or
Unsatisfactory
• 454,324 Private interstate motor
carriers, with 57,260 (12.6%) of
these having a safety rating of either
Satisfactory, Conditional, or
Unsatisfactory34
Since Administrator Anne Ferro states that the
FMCSA can only rate two or three percent of the
motor carriers annually35, it is unknown how
many of these are current, but by mathematical
certainty, many are so old they are meaningless
as far as current safety worthiness. While
spending $45 million on CSA 2010 since 2007,
and requesting $78 million for 2012,36 the
FMCSA has created new measurement
categories for "intervention” (of questionable
validity and reliability), but has not created a

system that can give a definitive and final Safety
Rating on all registered carriers. Their delegated
duty, under 49 U.S. Code § 31144, is to
“determine whether an owner or operator is fit to
operate safely commercial motor vehicles...”,
and to, “make such final safety fitness
determinations readily available to the public”,
[emphasis added]
The FMCSA claims, “The CSA 2010 will
ultimately provide FMCSA a new modemoperational model that will greatly enhance the
Agency’s efficiency at gathering and properly
evaluating a greater proportion of the regulated
population.” Flowever, only 11 percent of
registered carriers had any scores in the CSA
Safety Management System as of August 2011,37
and of those with scores at least one significant
study found, “...no meaningful statistical
relationship between actual accident frequency
and BASIC scores for Unsafe Driving, Fatigued
Driving or Driver Fitness.”38
Congress should focus on clarifying for the
FMCSA exactly what their duties and priorities
should be. At the current pace the FMCSA will
have spent over 120 million dollars on CSA
2010 by the end of budget year 2012, and at best
they have created a data recording system that
has questionable value for predicting carrier
safety for less than twenty percent of the
750,000 registered motor carriers. They still
have no system that accomplishes the rating of
all carriers as either; Satisfactory, Conditional, or
Unsatisfactory. I lowevcr, because of some
confused judicial understanding of exactly what
the SafeStat and SMS measurement systems can
provide, the FMCSA’s continued publication of
SMS BASICs measurements imply to the public,
and to some courts, that such data is valid for

34 FMCSA data base response to Freedom of Information Act inquiry, December 23, 2011.
35 See. Note 22
36 United States Government Accountability Office; Susan Fleming Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues; Report to
Congress, February 25, 2011; GAO-11-416R
37 Evaluation of the CSA 2010 Operational Model Test, supra
38 Wells Fargo, supra.
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evaluating a clear determination of carrier safety.
It simply is not.
Congress must recognize FMCSA’s clear failure
to provide final and timely Safety Ratings on all
registered motor carriers, and that within the
context of this failure they have caused courts
and the shipping public to be confused and
burdened as to a reasonable and fair process for
determining the safety worthiness of authorized
motor carriers. As a first step in correcting this
failure they should require FMCSA to remove
from public view the developmental data
(BASICs) now being displayed within the SMS.
By FMCSA’s own admission, its visibility and
decisions made there from may have unintended
consequences. Removing this data from public
view will also relieve brokers and the shipping
public from the mistaken judicial inference that
such data is a reliable source for a final Safety
Rating. Finally, and most import, requiring the
FMCSA to remove this incomplete
“intervention” data disabuses the notion that
brokers and other shippers should have a duty to
refer to it as a part of their diligent inquiry and
duty of reasonable care.
Once such data is removed from public view,
FMCSA may continue to develop it to a point of
reliability and perhaps increased efficiency in
performing their duty to provide final safety
determinations and safety ratings on all
registered carriers. In the interim, Congress, the
transportation industry, shipping public and
courts should not get confused by the FMCSA’s
apparent effort to rationalize and obfuscate their
failure to fulfill their statutory and regulatory
duty to provide to the public, “... final safety
fitness determinations”39 [emphasis added].
They simply have not done so in their entire
existence.

B. Future Jurisprudence Must Provide a
Duty of Reasonable Care for Brokers
That Corrects the Imputed Duty to Refer
to an Invalid Data Source
As has been demonstrated, the Schramm court
required brokers to refer to a system of carrier
safety evaluation (SafeStat) that was full of error,
invalid and unreliable on the day their decision
was announced. The successor to SafeStat,
SMS, is at best a work in progress and is also
invalid and unreliable as a definitive Safety
Rating on motor carriers. It is clearly disclaimed
as such by its originator, FMCSA.40 Future
litigators, and courts who hear such cases, must
develop a remedial standard of due care for
brokers that eliminates the Hobson’s choice of
being required to refer to the SMS measurement
system for a definitive Safety Rating. For the
vast majority of registered carriers it simply is
not there. If it is there it is of questionable
relevance due to issues of timeliness, errors in
reporting and ratios computed that are
imbalanced with greater weight to larger
carriers.
So much more is known (than at the time of the
Schramm decision) about the likely unreliability
of SMS data that courts should be more inclined
to exclude it as irrelevant, lacking in probative
value, confusing and untrustworthy. The Federal
Rules of Evidence and the corollary state rules,
have many provisions that should be considered
in motions in limine that fully develop the
questionable relevance, probative value,
confusion factor and hearsay nature of many of
the data categories within SMS.
• Fed.R.Evid. 401 says, "Relevant
evidence” means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more

39 Title 49, U.S.Code § 31144(3)
40 FMCSA, Safety Measurement System, http://ai.1mcsa.dot.yov/SMS/
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probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence.
• Fed.R.Evid. 403 prov ides that even
relevant information may be excluded if
its probative value is outweighed by a
danger that the evidence could be
confusing, misleading or a waste of the
court’s time.
• Fed.R.Evid. 803 (8) denies the
admission of government reports or data
compilations in civil actions if the
sources of information or other
circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.

published acknowledgment that all carriers are
authorized to operate on the nation’s roadways,
unless they have been given an Unsatisfactory
safety rating, is it more or less likely that
presentation of SMS data is both confusing and
untrustworthy under Rule 803 (8)?
It is suggested that more courts should rule as
the Middle District Court of Georgia did when
requested to take judicial notice of safety ratings
published on the former SafeStat, finding that
such data was not reliable evidence routinely
contemplated by the rules governing judicial
notice.42
CONCLUSION

Assume that a broker researches a carrier and
finds proper authority, regulatory insurance in
place and a safety rating other than
Unsatisfactory. The broker concludes that the
carrier is properly authorized by FMCSA, and
the broker has no current knowledge of
incompetence or unsafe operations by the carrier.
The broker knows that the SMS data is
incomplete and that it may contain BASICs data
that is incomplete and outdated, with ratios that
are skewed by large carrier presence, and that a
reputable statistical study concluded “...we find
no meaningful statistical relationship between
actual accident frequency and BASIC scores for
Unsafe Driving, Fatigued Driving or Driver
Fitness”.41

It has been argued herein that brokers and thirdparty logistics companies were for many years
under a reasonable standard of care in selecting
carriers, before the Schramm decision
erroneously required that they refer to a source
(SafeStat) that was invalid and unreliable in
order to meet their duty of diligent inquiry and
reasonable care. Furthermore, for all the reasons
stated herein, the successor to SafeStat,
FMCSA’s Safety Management System, is as
untrustworthy, if not more so.

Is admission of the SMS data, or broker's failure
to look at such data, fairly likely to make it more
or less probable that the broker was negligent?
Given the established unreliability of the former
SafeStat information, and the current state of
confusion regarding SMS measures, is there any
context in which the SMS data should not be
excluded under Rule 403? Given the FMCSA’s
acknowledgement that SMS data is not a safety
rating, but rather for internal intervention
purposes, along with their disclaimers and

With the proven failure of the FMCSA to
provide final safety determinations and safety
ratings for the vast majority of registered motor
carriers, there simply is no definitive source with
which brokers can make a meaningful
determination of carrier safety. They are left
with only a semblance of such a source. They
can do as they have done for many years and
refer to the safety rating provided by the
FMCSA, in those instances where it is available.
If such a rating is not available, surely the broker

V. Conclusion: Returning to a Sensible
Duty of Care for Brokers

41 Wells Fargo, supra
42 See FCCI Ins. Group v. Rodgers Metal Craft. Inc., 2008 WL 4185997 (M.D. Ga. 2008)
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cannot he negligent for failure to infer one from
what has been shown to be unreliable
information.
The FMCSA has clearly failed its statutory duty,
which in turn means that the Department of
Transportation has failed to provide to the public
“final safety determinations” and “safety ratings”
as mandated by 49 U.S. Code § 31144.
Congress has failed to properly recognize the
magnitude of this failure and require
accountability from FMCSA. Within this
context, the courts have failed by requiring of
brokers and third-party logistics companies a
responsibility that could not be fulfilled, no
matter how long they might look as SMS
BASICs data. It is time for the Congress,
FMCSA and the courts to realize the nature and
significance of this folly, and restore to brokers
and third-party logistics companies, who are
least culpable, a standard of care that is realistic
and takes into consideration the magnitude of
what has been wrought from the confusion on
this issue.
Congress must ask the FMCSA for answers to
the following: Can they provide to the public
final determinations of safety on all registered
carriers? If not. how do they intend to comply
with their statutory duty to do so? In asking
these question and listening to FMCSA’s
response, Congress should not be distracted by
FMCSA’s rhetoric about “intervention”...it is
not the same as providing safety ratings. If
developmental data such as BASICs is a worthy
element of ultimately getting to the ability to
provide safety ratings, then let it be recognized
as such and not as a rationalization for their
failure to perform their primary duty. It follows
that brokers should not be assigned this duty
with the intractable information now admitted by
FMCSA to be less than reliable for such a
purpose.43

The courts who in the future consider the duty of
brokers to use reasonable care in the selection of
carriers should do so with recognition of the
errors of the past. Such judicial reformation
might start with a more careful analysis of the
real role of brokers in the facilitation of
providing carriers for loads and loads for
carriers. It must also take into consideration that
some of the prior decisions that have imposed
impossible standards upon brokers have perhaps
been motivated by subjective reasoning. Courts
w ho reconsider the duty of brokers, in light of
the mistakes of the Schramm decision, might
consider the reasoning of Judge Smith of the
Georgia Court of Appeals,
...we arc troubled by the result in
this case... We cannot, however,
allow our sympathy for the plight of
those injured by commercial trucks
to lead us toward imposing strict
liability on a party that does not
possess the requisite degree of
control over another's conduct.
Resolution of this public policy issue
lies with the legislative branch of our
government, not with the judiciary.44
In the interim the courts can return to a more
sensible notion that carrier safety is administered
by FMCSA, and FMCSA has a statutory duty to
provide a final safety determination and safety
rating. Brokers and other third parties cannot
fairly be charged with this duty. It is reasonable
to suggest that this was the recognition of all
courts who considered this issue for the fifty
years preceding the Schramm decision.
* Readers should note that the formatting in this
article is reserved for Law' Review style articles.
Regular research oriented articles should be
formatted in conformance with the Journal’s
Submission Guidelines.

43 See Note 24
44 Clarendon Nat. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 666 ,E.2d 567, (Ga. App., 2008)
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